

A YEAR AND A HALF OF CYBER WAR

Pre War Cyber

The Cyber War


Conclusion

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


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Evolution of Russian Cyber Operations in Ukraine

February 2022 - June 2024



WHAT WE'LL LEARNED

- > Why intelligence collection delivers lasting advantage
- How cyber forces adapt to military demands
- When "cyber fires" work
- > The reality of sustained cyber operations
- Why Day 400 matters more than Day One



DESIGN BY DESCRIPTION

- > Theoreticians have heard about cyber
- Develop strategies and tactics from first principles
- *Assume a hacker of radius R traveling at constant velocity in a vacuum...



CYBER FIRES

Like kinetic, but different



CYBER SUPER WEAPON

Devastating futuristic capability



DEVASTATING OPENING STRIKE

Overwhelm and destroy







ROUTINE CYBER OPERATIONS

Most days



MISSION REQUIREMENTS

- Do what needs doing
- Meet military needs today
 - > Preferably yesterday
- **Objectives dictate capability**





WARTIME CYBER MODALITIES

Information Operations:

Using the information environment to influence people

Effects Operations:

Directly impacting adversary systems and infrastructure

Espionage Operations:

Collecting information, typically over a long time

Note: Both Effects and Espionage depend on Access, while Information Operations can function independently

THE EFFECTS/ESPIONAGE ACCESS DICHOTOMY

Effects Operations

- Usually visible/apparent
- Burns access resource
- Primary value is in exploiting the effects

Espionage Operations

- Relies on secrecy
- Covert use of access resource
- Continuing intelligence yield

UTILITY OF ACCESS-BASED OPERATIONS

Espionage Operations

Almost always valuable - provides ongoing intelligence advantage

Effects Operations Valuable only when:

- Effect can be immediately exploited
- Tactical gain outweighs loss of intelligence source
- No alternative means to achieve same effect

STRATEGIC PRINCIPLE

ESPIONAGE IS THE BEST USE OF ACCESS EXCEPT WHEN EFFECTS CAN BE EXPLOITED







- > SVR: Foreign Intelligence Service
 - > Self-styled elite cyber operators
 - > Traditional espionage focus



- > FSB: Federal Security Service
 - **Large cyber capability**
 - Internal + crossborder operations



- > GRU: Military Intelligence
 - > Technically military intelligence
 - Actually a broad state actor
 - **Most active in Ukraine**



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July 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

THEPLAN

- Largest combined arms cyber operation ever
- Goal: Support coup de main strategy
 - > Isolate Ukrainian leadership
 - **Disrupt military communications**
- > Enable rapid regime change
- > Years of preparation




OPENING MOVES

- > KA-SAT Attack (3:02 AM)
 - > Satellite communications disrupted
 - > Tens of thousands of modems bricked
 - **Europe-wide impact**
- **♦** Government Systems (4:00 AM)
 - DDoS against official websites
 - > Wiper malware deployed
 - Communications degraded



TACTICAL SUCCESS

- **Communications successfully disrupted**
- **BUT:**
 - **Leadership maintained contact via alternate channels**
 - > Social media and messaging apps still worked
 - > Military adapted to civilian infrastructure
 - > Prepared operations quickly exhausted



CATCH-22

- Need to isolate leadership from military/population
- > But also need communication channels for:
 - **Announcing new regime**
 - > Maintaining civil order
 - Basic governance
- > Can't have it both ways




LESSONS LEARNED

- **Technical capabilities ≠ Strategic success**
- > Prepared operations run out
- > Target adapts and route around damage










OPERATIONAL PAUSE

- **Successfully executed all prepared operations √**
- **Used all pre-positioned access √**
- **Ran all the scripts √**
- **>** Wrote all the after-action reports ✓
- > ... Now What?





PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3

Invade Ukraine



Profit








TACTICS IS WHAT YOU DO WHEN THERE IS SOMETHING TO DO. STRATEGY IS WHAT YOU DO WHEN THERE IS NOTHING TO DO.


Savielly Tartakower

- > What to do after you've done everything?
- > Theres always something to do...











- > No strategic guidance
- No clear objectives
- **But need to show value**
- > Everyone doing... something






METRICS OVER MEANING

- Focus on quantifiable results:
 - More companies hacked
 - More DDoS attacks
 - More wipers deployed
 - > Line goes up!
- But to what end?


THE POLITICS OF ACTIVITY

- > Cyber forces showing they're contributing
- But no clear military objectives
- **Lots of activity ≠ Impact**
- **External observers confused**
- Internal metrics satisfied




INDUSTROYER2

- > Target: Ukrainian power grid
 - Quick, cheap operation
 - Minimal impact
- **Why bother? Because:**
 - > "Cyber war means hitting infrastructure"
 - > Political necessity of demonstrating value




- > Some empirical discoveries:
 - **CCTV** operations prove valuable
 - > Intel collection works
 - > Proximity to front matters
- > Real adaptation emerging









WINTER STRATEGY


- > Targeting civilian infrastructure alongside missile campaign
- Attempt to undermine Ukrainian society's will to resist

PLAYING THEIR PART

- Winter counter-value campaign begins
- Missile forces hitting infrastructure
- > Air forces bombing power grid
- And cyber forces...?
 - > "We should probably do something too"











- Minimum Viable Campaign
 - **Execute some attacks**
 - **>** Show willing
- > Save effort for what matters
- Meet political requirements efficiently










SPYING IS BACK ON THE MENU



SUPPORTING MILITARY OPERATIONS

- **Edge device persistence**
 - Quick reentry when main access lost
 - **Adapt to defender's improvements**
 - Sustainable presence

- Battle Damage Assessment
 - CCTV access for missile strike assessment
 - Substitute for limited satellite coverage
 - **Emergency services monitoring**

TACTICAL ADAPTATION

- > New exploitation techniques
- **Rapid intelligence collection procedures**
- Opportunistic targeting






PROFESSIONAL GROWTH


- Force structure expansion
 - More operators
 - Better integration
 - Civilians / contractors


- > Intelligence focus
 - Clear military value
 - Sustainable operations
 - Tangible results




- New operational doctrine:
 - > Speed in execution to beat defenders
 - > Grab everything within the first 30 minutes
 - **Better some intel than none**
- Real adaptation to defender's capabilities

- Intelligence over effects
- > "Spy first" doctrine
- > Force structure expansion
 - **2x increase in operations volume**
- Military integration critical









The Strategic Shift to Intelligence Collection

From effects to intelligence: Enduring advantage in attritional war





Evolution of Russian Cyber Operational Methodology





EVOLUTIONARY CHANGES


- Move from effects operations to espionage
- Tighter integration of GRU to military
- **Expanded capacity and integrated civilians**
- > TTP changes
 - **Edge devices (plus deception)**
 - Rapid exploitation
 - Repeated attacks











REALITY OF PROLONGED CYBER WARFARE

- **Espionage provides continuing advantage**
- **Effects operations have limited strategic value**
- Adaptability trumps initial capability

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

- Initial invasion plans run out
- Week-long operational pause
- **Chaotic return and adaptation**
- > Testing counter-value operations

- **What actually works:**
 - > Intelligence over effects
 - Integration over autonomy
 - **Adaptation over preparation**

LESSONS FOR CYBER WARFARE THEORY

- Why Day 400 matters more than Day One
- Intelligence collection as the enduring value of cyber
- > The importance of operational integration

- > Dramatic shifts in operational focus
- **Adaptation through necessity**
- **Evolution of capabilities**
- > The primacy of intelligence

SHOOT THE SERVER ROOM DURING EVACUATION





